




A Matter of
TRUST

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES
IN ENERGY DECISION-MAKING

Shale Gas
Exploration



Case Study

Kent County and Elsipogtog First Nation
New Brunswick

CANADA WEST FOUNDATION & UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

We would like to thank those who agreed to be interviewed for this study. Their insights and contributions were invaluable in preparing this report.

As is customary, any errors of fact or interpretation remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

Copies of the *A Matter of Trust: The role of communities in energy decision-making* report and the six case studies are available for download on the Canada West Foundation and Positive Energy websites.

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A background image showing several people's hands and forearms in a meeting or collaborative setting. The hands are positioned as if they are gesturing or about to clasp together. The lighting is soft and natural, creating a professional yet relaxed atmosphere. The colors are muted, with shades of blue, grey, and skin tones.

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CONTEXT

The community

Kent County is a rural area in New Brunswick featuring coastal and inland villages and a unique mix of three cultures (Elsipogtog, Acadian, Anglophone). Unemployment is high (16.6%) and so is illiteracy (40% of adults do not have a high school diploma) (Statistics Canada, 2011a, 2011b). Median incomes are low (\$24,387). There is no history of oil and gas production in the area and less than 1.5% of the population works in mining. Other natural resource sectors – forestry and fishing – are more prominent.

There is a historical context of expropriation both recent (Kouchibigouac National Park in the 1950s) and further back (Acadian expulsion in 1700s) that makes residents skeptical and cautious of shale gas exploration activities. One-tenth of the Kent County population is Indigenous. The Mi'gmaq never ceded territory but rather signed a “Peace and Friendship Treaty” with the British Crown, with responsibilities on either side for protection (INAC, undated). The symbolic, strategic and legal importance of this fact to resisting fracking development is important not only to the Elsipogtog community, but also to other non-Indigenous voices in Kent County, who forged new relationships during the blockades and protests of 2013. Violent clashes with RCMP in October 2013 to evict Mi'gmaq protestors feature strongly in Kent County resident descriptions of fracking issues. Politically, the region tends to vote Liberal, and that is the governing party that instituted a moratorium on fracking. Another unique feature of Kent County is that two-thirds of residents live outside of incorporated municipalities, and have no elected municipal representation.

The project

Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in New Brunswick is in early phases compared to other Canadian provinces, such as British Columbia or Alberta. As part of attempts to expand the industry and participate in the continental growth of the shale gas industry, the New Brunswick government awarded Texas-based SWN Energy Co. licences to search one-fifth of the province for shale gas potential in 2010, including large parts of Kent County (Government of New Brunswick, 2010). These exploration activities were licensed with minimal oversight (as is traditional in mining regulation – with the expectation that production activities will be regulated more extensively).

Seismic testing took longer than expected because there were public protests. It was not until mid-2014 that SWN began the process to drill four exploratory wells. That process included public notification through newspaper notices and online posting of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) documents (Stantec, 2014). After a new provincial government was elected in October 2014 and carried out its promise to place a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in December 2014, SWN stopped its activities. A government-appointed commission held hearings across the province throughout 2015 to find out more about the root issues underlying public concern.

The commission issued its report in early 2016 (New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing, 2016) and, in May 2016, the government extended the moratorium indefinitely (Government of New Brunswick, 2016). There is a small-scale shale gas industry in the south of the province featuring 40 previously fracked wells. Natural gas distribution and consumption is centred in the southern part of the province and not in Kent County. There is some provincial infrastructure in place for a large scale export sector, notably a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in St. John.

ISSUES

Interviews and telephone surveys with community residents revealed that **water contamination concerns** were consistently the most important factor affecting community member impressions of fracking and efforts to regulate fracking in New Brunswick. For some, the **unknown risks** associated with water contamination, waste water, potentially uncontrolled release of methane and uncertainties over number and placement of wells are especially troubling. For others involved in the industry and in the business community, the fact that shale gas extraction, including fracking, had taken place in the Sussex region of the province without incident meant that risks were known and manageable. These individuals consistently spoke of shale gas development to fulfill a **need for economic development and jobs**, referring to New Brunswick's high level of debt and deficit.

"For the man on the street, water contamination is the big issue."

(Anonymous 1, elected rep)

"People ask if the government can guarantee that their water won't be contaminated, of course they can't guarantee that."

(Paul Lang, public official)

"Fracking for shale gas is an experiment and it is not right to be exposed to that."

(Denise, civil society leader)

"The government's decision to extend the moratorium does not indicate a full recognition of the enormous potential benefits to a provincial economy that is struggling to achieve growth. Neither does it recognize that the industry has operated safely and responsibly for decades in New Brunswick and across Canada."

(Valerie, business community)

Interviews revealed a general lack of confidence in the ability of regulators to oversee a relatively new technology like hydraulic fracturing to extract shale gas. There are multiple elements to this. First is a **lack of confidence in the ability of public officials to enforce any environmental regulation**; 60 per cent of those surveyed felt they had low or somewhat low confidence in regulators to enforce environmental regulation. The second factor leading to a lack of confidence in regulators are **controversies involving prominent public authority figures** (more below). Finally, there is recognition among various actors, including regulators themselves, that **the dual role** played by the Department of Mines and Energy as both a proponent and regulator of the shale gas industry is problematic. Indigenous voices stressed that the **whole trust foundation for regulation was missing**.

“New Brunswick has good people in civil service, but mostly things don’t get enforced because there are not enough people to do it.”

(Jim, civil society leader)”

“We know that it is a problem when the department that regulates industry is also promoting it.”

(Anonymous 3, Provincial government official)

“There is no trust. Status quo doesn’t work. No amount of regulation will help with that.”

(Mousie, former Elsipogtog Band councillor)

Overall there is strong opposition to shale gas development in the region. More than two-thirds of residents surveyed opposed or somewhat opposed the project. Opposition levels reach 80 per cent for Indigenous residents.

The formal/expected **PROCESS**

There is not a long-standing established process for regulation of a large-scale unconventional gas sector in New Brunswick. Policy-makers recognized the need to update existing rules to take into account new technologies. In May 2012, the provincial government publicly released recommendations for updated rules (Government of New Brunswick, 2012) which were issued February 2013 (Government of New Brunswick, 2013). These rules draw on requirements put in place in other jurisdictions, notably Alberta. Both proponents and policy-makers consider them strict. Most of the enforcement is to be carried out by the Department of Environment and Local Government under the authority of EIA regulations.

It is important to note that these actions were taken two years after the province issued exploration licences for more than one million hectares. As is common in mining regulation, these licences were issued with minimal oversight on proponent exploration activities. Following public concerns over potential damage to water quality from a fracking industry, the province put in place new interim requirements on seismic testing in June 2011 (CBC News, 2011). These requirements called for baseline water testing on any wells within 200 metres of seismic test and 500 metres of drilling sites, and disclosure of chemicals used in fracking. Given the public concern over water quality, it is also important to note that the provincial Ombudsman criticized the New Brunswick government in 2014 for failing to implement legislation to classify waterways and initiate steps for protection (Office of the Ombudsman, 2014).

In terms of proponent pre-regulatory activities, the proponent SWN Resources undertook some pre-EIA consultation actions with First Nation organizations. The provincial government (Crown) recommended that SWN notify the adjacent First Nations communities about the seismic program, compile information on the traditional use of the proposed seismic route, and discuss related issues and concerns (Government of New Brunswick, 2013). Some of this activity was done under the auspices of the Assembly of First Nation Chiefs of New Brunswick, an organization from which the Elsipogtog First Nation withdrew in 2013, citing inadequacies in the shale gas exploration consultation process.

Interview participants said there was no noticeable pre-regulatory engagement with the population of Kent County during seismic testing. Survey findings broadly support this, but reveal that a sizeable minority of 38% per cent of residents did feel that information about the project was available in a timely manner.

The first significant formal requirements for notification and public comment on proponent activities took place before the drilling of exploratory wells. SWN published EIA documentation in April 2014 detailing location of well pads, road construction activities, drilling details, and potential impacts to air quality, GHGs, and water (Stantec, 2014). SWN provided written notification to landowners and public officials, and made the EIA documentation available online and at a local library. Department of Environment officials approved the material in August 2014. Drilling did not proceed, however, as a provincial election that month and moratorium decision at the end of the year delayed SWN's plans for exploratory wells.

PERSPECTIVES & POSITIONS

Public statements: As part of the 2015 Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing, multiple public statements were made by industry and civil society groups. The major industry group, the New Brunswick Responsible Energy Development Alliance (NBREDA), urged the commission to “let facts be the guide” and recognize that fracking is occurring safely across Canada and in the southern part of New Brunswick (New Brunswick Responsible Energy Development Alliance, 2015). It stressed that natural gas is a transition fuel to lower carbon emissions and suggested that only by lifting the moratorium will New Brunswickers have information on the potential size of the resource.

The public statements from NBREDA align closely with the comments made by interview participants from the business community category. On the other side, the New Brunswick Anti-Shale Gas Alliance (NBASGA), which represents 22 different community groups including those in Kent County, points to uncertainties in the impacts of fracking, citing widely, including from the 2015 Council of Canadian Academies report on the topic. NBASGA points out that multiple jurisdictions have put moratoria in place. NBASGA further questions the carbon benefits of extracting natural gas (methane) which burns cleaner than other fossil fuels but is itself a potent greenhouse gas if released into the atmosphere (New Brunswick Anti-Shale Gas Alliance, undated). These comments align closely with comments by interview participations from the civil society leader category.

In EIA filings, the proponent SWN states that commercial development of unconventional gas resources could provide employment opportunities, leasing opportunities for landowners, supply chain business opportunities, and royalties and taxes for the New Brunswick government. During interviews, representatives of other shale gas companies active in other regions of the province point to positive relations with landowners but acknowledge that the opposition is well-organized and effective at disseminating information. There is an active network of environmental groups, including NBASGA and affiliated groups, that have arranged New Brunswick visits for prominent figures in the U.S. anti-fracking movement, such as former mayor Calvin Tillman featured in *Gasland*, and Cornell's Dr. Anthony Ingraffea.

Other notable positions: Dr. Eilish Cleary, the former Chief Medical Officer of Health in New Brunswick, published a report recommending health impact assessments and rules to promote community well-being prior to unconventional gas development taking place (Chief Medical Officer of New Brunswick, 2012). Many interview participants referred to this case and to her recommendations. She was released from her position in December 2015 in a move widely seen to be in retaliation for her report. The Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing and New Brunswick Medical Society both expressed concern over the way in which Cleary was released (New Brunswick Medical Society, 2016). This episode plays an important role in attitudes towards public authorities.

“We don’t have a lot of faith in government authorities when people we trust are fired; when a trusted information source is gone.”

(Tina, local representative referring to the dismissal of Chief Medical Officer Dr. Eilish Cleary, without cause, by the provincial government.)

It is worth highlighting some comments from Indigenous voices during interviews. There is a deeply held value that allowing fracking would not be respecting past and future generations.

“The land is not ours to sell, we are caretakers. ... We honour our ancestors for the sacrifices they made for our people, our children and grandchildren to come.”

(Mousie, former Elsipogtog Councillor)

There is a complex history of consultation with the proponent SWN and the Elsipogtog First Nation. Most of this was carried out under the auspices of the Association of First Nations Chiefs of New Brunswick. Following the election of a new chief at Elsipogtog in 2013, the Elsipogtog Nation withdrew from the AFNCNB. Elsipogtog officials also spoke of problematic moves from the provincial government, which made the mistake of selling exploration leases to Elsipogtog reserve lands near Moncton – this was clearly not the province's land to include when issuing licences to search.

Finally, it is important to comment on the violent clash that took place in October 2013 near Kent County. While it is not the focus of the research project, it features strongly in Kent County resident descriptions of fracking issues. It is also important in understanding the broader community confidence in public authorities. The confrontation tested the limits of government's monopoly authority on the use of force. Trust was eroded among some community members who feel the RCMP acted badly (for more see Howe, 2015). Some people seriously believe the burning of police cars seen on national news was set up by police. There is an active civilian complaints commission inquiry ongoing (RCMP, 2015).

THE OUTCOME

The outcome in this case study is that a provincial policy decision was made to place an indefinite moratorium on hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in New Brunswick. Unconventional shale gas production in Kent County was not built as planned and a new regulatory regime for fracking was prepared but not fully tested. The province put in place five conditions that must be met before the moratorium could be lifted (Government of New Brunswick, 2016). These are:

- 1 Social licence is in place;
- 2 Clear and credible information is available about the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on public health, the environment and water, allowing the government to develop a country-leading regulatory regime with sufficient enforcement capabilities;
- 3 A plan is in place to mitigate the impacts on public infrastructure and to address issues such as waste water disposal;
- 4 A process is in place to respect the duty of the provincial government to consult with First Nations; and,
- 5 A mechanism is in place to ensure that benefits are maximized for New Brunswickers, including the development of a proper royalty structure.

It is difficult to see how fracking in New Brunswick could proceed. It is important to note that changing market conditions also played a part in the moratorium decision. Prices for natural gas are half of what they were in October 2013. However, the government did single out four recommendations from the New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing which it would have to implement before reassessing the issue. No timeline was given for action on these recommendations.

- 1 An independent regulator should be created with a mandate to strengthen New Brunswick's monitoring and evaluation of shale gas development in terms of understanding cumulative effects, including impact on human health and the environment;
- 2 Adequate resources must be assigned to properly plan for potential public infrastructure impacts;
- 3 Short-term and long-term solutions to hydraulically fractured wastewater should be determined before commercial production begins; and
- 4 The provincial government needs to work with aboriginal leadership in New Brunswick to adopt a nation-to-nation consultation process for hydraulic fracturing.

In terms of promised benefits, unconventional shale gas production in New Brunswick has not delivered what was hoped for. The RFP for exploration activities required SWN to invest \$47 million in exploration activities. These activities were delayed and involved multiple court injunctions and public costs in terms of policing and court costs. There was a hope for additional millions in government revenues from royalties and employment when production started. This has not occurred. SWN closed its Moncton office in March 2016, citing uncertainty about the industry.

In general, the high degree of attention given to fracking by New Brunswick politicians makes this a unique case. The 2014 provincial election was campaigned by parties putting forward opposite views: one pro-shale gas development, the other promising a moratorium. The moratorium side won the election and put in place first a temporary, and then an indefinite, ban. To put it in the terms of the goal of the Positive Energy/Canada West Foundation research project, publicly elected representatives decided the shale gas energy resources **could not be** developed in a way that garners acceptance and benefits society at large. The interviews tended to confirm a lack of acceptance. Those active in the provincial business community and proponents were in favour of shale gas development proceeding but, at the local level of Kent County, 70 per cent of the population surveyed (and 80 per cent of Elsipogtog First Nation members) were opposed to shale gas exploration.

Assessment against

THE FRAME

Context

The social context of high levels of illiteracy within Kent County and a sensitivity over past expropriation appear to have not been adequately considered. The lack of a more thorough notification process for exploration activities was problematic and shows a potential lack of understanding of how an essentially unannounced presence in the community mapping out territory would have been received.

Additionally, the approach of engaging the local First Nation through the New Brunswick First Nation umbrella organization may have blinded the proponent to a sizeable and powerful constituency within the Elsipogtog community whose interests were not represented at those engagements. The conventional procedure of approaching the provincial level body of the AFNCNB to meet requirements to consult with Indigenous representatives appears to have bypassed a thorough understanding of local Elsipogtog residents' position on shale exploration within their traditional territory. The alleged failure of the AFNCNB to represent Elsipogtog interests in discussions with SWN led the newly elected Chief of the Elsipogtog First Nation to withdraw from the AFNCNB. The consequences of these complicated questions of representation were far-reaching and contributed to the blockade and violent incident in October 2013.

Values, attitudes and interests

The fundamental issues of water contamination concerns on the one hand and jobs and investment benefits on the other came up frequently and were expressed in both formal public statements and in interviews.

Information

Among both the pro- and anti-fracking voices, a theme of inadequate information emerged. Local politicians spoke of the need for more town hall meetings and proponents spoke of a suspicion that the general public was unaware of new rules for industry. The results of the telephone survey suggest that this suspicion was unwarranted. Fully 80 per cent of respondents indicated they were aware of the new 2013 rules for fracking. When it comes down to who has the responsibility to provide information, there are no clear views. Most (58 per cent) felt the federal or provincial government should be responsible, but a large proportion (43 per cent) looked to NGOs as sources and (21 per cent) thought proponents should be the entity providing project information.

There was also an acknowledgement that civil society organizations had been more successful at getting out information than proponents or government. Some felt this information was not factual, but there was also a recognition on the part of some regulators and public officials that civil society activists and others were well-informed but had different values. In general, no one source of information was seen to be

unbiased and objective. One candidate organization for neutrality was the New Brunswick Energy Institute. This third-party organization came out of a recommendation of Louis Lapierre's 2012 provincial tour. After the credential scandal, the institute lost public credibility, although it continues to report and research issues associated with energy development in New Brunswick.

Engagement

The New Brunswick case study relates to the wide range of public consultation and engagement attempts for the fracking issue. **Seven distinct outreach activities were found during case study research:** (1) Louis Lapierre tour of nine locations across New Brunswick in mid-2012 seeking feedback on proposed shale gas regulations; (2) Virtual town halls, streamed and phone-in questions held by Department of Energy and Mines on feedback on proposed shale gas regulations in 2012; (3) Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers representatives undertaking more than 150 meetings with local Chamber of Commerce organizations giving “Hydraulic Fracturing 101” presentations; (4) Meetings between proponent SWN and AFNCNB representatives and elders from Elsipogtog; (5) Efforts by proponents of active gas wells (not in Kent County) to check in with landowners regularly and inform decisions to do maintenance ahead of time; (6) Notification and public comment period of environmental protection measures for exploratory well drilling as part of EIA process in 2014; (7) Commission touring the province throughout 2015 with the wide mandate of hearing from citizens on the root causes of the conflicts surrounding the shale gas issues.

The point of listing these items is to offer some context regarding the widespread perception of inadequate consultation and information noted by interview participants. It is not as though the regulator,

proponents and policy-makers were completely ignoring public outreach and consultation. Rather, the consultation was not targeted appropriately. For example, residents of Kent County had no notification and opportunity to ask questions of the proponent or of government officials regarding the exploration going on in their area. Instead, the Lapierre tour was at a general policy level of proposed regulations, as were the virtual town hall meetings. The CAPP presentations were explicitly designed to not be open to the public for fear of attracting controversy. The meetings between SWN and AFNCNB were complicated by questions of who accurately represented the Elsipogtog community. The plan for notification and public comment period as part of the EIA process occurred too late in the exploration schedule and well after distrust had built.

Thus, one significant finding from this case study is that for consultation to mean anything to community members, it has to be relevant and in scope with what is occurring in their communities.

Finally, it is important to recognize that although trust in energy decision-making authorities is low in Kent County (65 per cent reported low or somewhat low trust levels), the moratorium decision has been welcomed and appears to have restored some confidence in the energy decision making process. When asked if the provincial government decision to extend the moratorium indefinitely made residents more or less confident in energy decision making authorities, 65 per cent reported they more or much more confident.

Comparison to elite

INTERVIEW FINDINGS

Finally, it is also useful to contrast differences in the elite interview results with those of the community level interviews and survey results. Key differences between community interview findings and those of the elite interviews are highlighted below.

Elite interview finding #1

Decisions are hobbled by unresolved policy issues beyond the regulatory system, particularly on climate change and the rights and responsibilities of Indigenous communities. A more diverse set of environmental issues led by concerns about water and generally regional in scope comes in not far behind.

Reflections from community interviews:

This notion of unresolved policy issues hobbling the decision process is less important based on community interviews from this case. Climate change was not a dominant issue in interviews. Opposition centred on water contamination concerns that are within the theoretical remit of regulators. Furthermore, some of the water issues were more planning level issues, rather than policy level. For example, the province has approved a water classification system and set up a system for protection, but not implemented them.

The unresolved policy issues surrounding Indigenous rights issues are more important. The protests and blockades invoked treaty language and it is widely accepted by all participants that the Elsipogtog have special standing and importance in decision-making process.

Elite interview finding #2

Individual project decision processes have become the default mechanism for dealing with issues like climate change that go well beyond any single project. Regulatory proceedings are not suited to the task. Resolving the issue is essentially the business of policy-makers.

This does not correlate very well with the New Brunswick case study. The big issue with fracking in New Brunswick is about water contamination and not climate change. This is well within the scope of single project decision processes. In particular, the decision to issue exploration licences was poorly handled, and arguably involved too little oversight over the proponent. Issuing rules to do baseline water testing happened **two years** after licences to explore were issued.

Regulators were acting within their legislative mandate and it is the responsibility of policy-makers to provide the regulation for the regulator to oversee/enforce. A complicating factor here is that the regulator function for exploration licensing is within the same department that promotes shale gas exploration (Department of Energy and Mines).

One of the conclusions from the interim report that is particularly relevant to this case study is that policy and planning are hard, especially in a market-based economic system where the vast majority of investment decisions are in private hands and where limitations on individual freedom run up against habit, culture and legal precedent.

New Brunswick used a market-based tool – a request for tender – for the private sector to explore and map shale gas potential over one-fifth of the province. The uncertainty over the resource potential meant uncertainty over the potential for investment and growth of an oil and gas sector. Understandably, there was a delayed effort on the part of policy-makers to create a more comprehensive regulatory framework for shale gas production (including an independent regulator) until the sector had grown. However, as the New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing stated, *“While this makes financial sense, it fails*

to meet the standard of effective regulatory policy, which is to provide robust and trusted enforcement of government regulations” (New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing, 2016, p. 26).

The New Brunswick case raises an additional consideration not highlighted in the interim report. That is how much effort should, and can, be expended on the part of policy-makers to develop regulations for nascent technologies or practices with uncertain futures.

EXHIBIT TO APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

CATEGORY	PARTICIPANTS
Elected representatives (including indigenous)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Anonymous 1 (former mayor of a municipal government in Kent County) → Tina Beers (Local Service District Chair and member for Harcourt on Kent Regional Service Commission) → Mary Jane Milliea-Sieber (former Elsipogtog Band Councillor)
Civil society leaders (NGOs / activists)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Jim Emberger (New Brunswick Anti-Shale Gas Alliance) → Richard Lachance (Kent South No Shale Gas) → Eveline Haché (Kent South No Shale Gas) → Denise Melanson (Upriver Environmental Watch) → Paul Melanson (Upriver Environmental Watch)
Local energy developers and industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Anonymous 2 (regional rep of national industry association) → Joel Richardson (Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters) → Jody Pratt (Kent Centre Chamber of Commerce) → Valerie Roy (Atlantic Chamber of Commerce) → Anonymous 5 (proponent)
Regulators (or other public authorities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Anonymous 3 (official within NB Department of Energy and Resource Development) → Paul Lang (ED, Kent Regional Service Commission) → Eilish Cleary (former Chief Medical Health Officer of New Brunswick) → DJ Joseph (Elsipogtog Band Manager)
Local media and engaged citizens (including indigenous)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Dallas McQuarrie (writes for Media-coop) → Anonymous 4 (independent journalist) → Joan Millea (Elsipogtog community member)

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
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Snapshot of community response to energy projects



Kitimat

1 in 2

support or somewhat support Northern Gateway

Eckville and Rimbey

More than 1/2

of residents said a fair needs assessment showing the need for WATL would change their support

Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation

COMMUNITY INPUT

during design and planning led to significant redesign

Oakville and King Township

More than 70%

were concerned about local environmental impacts

St-Valentin

THE “FLIP”

to a new proponent undermined trust in both the proponent and public authorities


Kent County

59%

expressed low confidence in the capacity of the regulator to enforce rules

Nanos Research on behalf of the Canada West Foundation and University of Ottawa's Positive Energy project conducted surveys between July and September 2016 with 1,775 respondents to assess views within each case study community on the role of local in energy decision-making.

The six case studies are available for download on the Canada West Foundation (cwf.ca) and Positive Energy website (uottawa.ca/positive-energy)



NORTHERN GATEWAY ENERGY PIPELINE

*Kitimat and Haisla Nation
British Columbia*



WESTERN ALBERTA TRANSMISSION LINE (WATL)

*Eckville and Rimbey
Alberta*



WUSKWATIM HYDROELECTRIC FACILITY

*Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation
Manitoba*



GAS-FIRED POWER FACILITIES

*Oakville and King Township
Ontario*



WIND FARM

*St-Valentin
Québec*



SHALE GAS EXPLORATION

*Kent County and
Elsipogtog First Nation
New Brunswick*

THE CENTRE FOR NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
CHAMPIONS THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT
OF WESTERN CANADIAN RESOURCES
TO SAFEGUARD CANADA'S PROSPERITY.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA'S POSITIVE ENERGY PROJECT
USES THE CONVENING POWER OF THE UNIVERSITY
TO BRING TOGETHER ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS AND
DECISION-MAKERS TO DETERMINE HOW ENERGY RESOURCES
CAN BE DEVELOPED IN WAYS
THAT GARNER SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE.



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POSITIVE ENERGY